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Application of Coupled Fixed (or Best Proximity) Points in Market Equilibrium
in Oligopoly Markets.
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Abstract
We present a possible kind of generalization of the notion of ordered pairs of cyclic maps and coupled fixed points
and its application in modelling of equilibrium in oligopoly markets. We have obtained sufficient conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of fixed (or best proximity) points in complete metric spaces (uniformly convex Banach
spaces). We get an error estimates of the fixed (or best proximity), provided that we have used sequences of successive
iterations. We illustrate one possible application of the results by building a pragmatic model on competition in
oligopoly markets. To achieve this goal, we use an approach based on studying the response functions of each market
participant, thus making it possible to address both Cournot and Bertrand industrial structures with unified formal
method. In contrast to the restrictive theoretical constructs of duopoly equilibrium, our study is able to account
for real-world limitations like minimal sustainable production levels and exclusive access to certain resources. We
prove and demonstrate that by using carefully constructed response functions it is possible to build and calibrate a
model that reflects different competitive strategies used in extremely concentrated markets. The response functions
approachmakes it also possible to take into consideration different barriers to entry. By fitting to the response functions
rather than the profit maximization of the payoff functions problem we alter the classical optimization problem to
a problem of coupled fixed points, which has the benefit that considering corner optimum, corner equilibria and
convexity condition of the payoff function can be skipped.
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1. Introduction
The Banach contraction principle is a powerful tool both in pure and applied mathematics. It states that in a
complete metric space (X, ρ) any contraction map T : X → X has a fixed point, i.e. min{ρ(x, T x) : x ∈ X} = 0. A lot of
results in modelling real world processes in applied mathematics lead to the problem of finding min{ρ(x, T x) : x ∈ X}.
It may happen that the above minimum is greater than zero. One approach for tackling the over said issues utilizes the
idea of best proximity points, firstly presented in [1], where a sufficient condition for the existence and the uniqueness
of best proximity points in uniformly convex Banach spaces is obtained.
There is a great number of generalizations of the mentioned above principle. One class of such generalizations
appears, when the constructed model may depends on two parameters, i.e. F : X × X → X. The notion of coupled
fixed points [2] and of a coupled best proximity points for an ordered pair (F,G), F : A × A → B, G : B × B → A,
where A, B ⊂ X [3, 4], is relevant in this context. Deep results in the theory of coupled fixed points can be found for
example in [5, 6, 7].
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Following [8, 9, 10] the model of duopoly market consists of two players i = 1, 2, each player corrects its produc-
tion accordingly to his production and the productions of the other player, i.e. Fi : A1 × A2 → Ai, where Fi be the
response function of the i player and Ai be the production set of the i. That is why we could not apply the known results
about coupled fixed (or best proximity) points results, i.e considering the response functions to be F : A × A → B,
G : B × B → A, in the theory of oligopoly (duopoly) markets.
There are numerous issues about fixed points and best proximity points that are not simple to be solved or can not
be solved precisely. Well known benefits of fixed points results are the error estimates of the successive iterations and
the rate of convergence. That is why an estimation of the error when an iterative process is used is of interest, when
fixed points or best proximity points are investigated. An extensive study about approximations of fixed points can be
found in [11]. A to begin with result within the approximation of the sequence of successive iterations, converging
to the best proximity point for cyclic contractions, is obtained in [12]. This result was extended about a coupled best
proximity point in [13, 14].
We have illustrated in the application section that starting form any initial level of production an equilibrium point
exist and we have calculated the error estimates.
2. Preliminaries
We will recall the needed notions and results, that we will use.
Let (X, ρ) be a metric space. A distance between two subsets A, B ⊂ X is defined by dist(A, B) = inf{ρ(x, y) : x ∈
A, y ∈ B}. Following [1] let A and B be nonempty subsets of a metric space (X, ρ). The map T : A⋃ B → A⋃ B is
called a cyclic map if T (A) ⊆ B and T (B) ⊆ A. A point ξ ∈ A is called a best proximity point of the cyclic map T in A
if ρ(ξ, Tξ) = dist(A, B).
Definition 1. ([4]) Let A and B be nonempty subsets of a metric space (X, ρ), F : A × A → B. An ordered pair
(x, y) ∈ A × A is called a coupled best proximity point of F if ρ(x, F(x, y)) = ρ(y, F(y, x)) = dist(A, B).
Let A be nonempty subset of a metric space (X, ρ). The map T : A → A is said to have a fixed point x ∈ A if
ρ(ξ, Tξ) = 0.
Definition 2. ([2]) Let A and B be nonempty subsets of a metric space (X, ρ), F : A × A → A. An ordered pair
(x, y) ∈ A × A is said to be a coupled fixed point of F in A if x = F(x, y) and y = F(y, x).
In order to apply the technique of coupled best proximity points and coupled fixed points we will generalize the
mentioned above notions. When we investigate duopoly with players’ response functions F and f , we have seen that
each player using the information about his production and the rival’s production choose a change in his production,
i.e. we define F : A× B→ A instead of the cyclic type of maps F : A× B → B (Definition 1). Therefore we introduce
generalizations of Definition 1 and Definition 2.
Definition 3. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty subsets of a metric space (X, ρ), F : Ax × Ay → Ax, f : Ax × Ay → Ay. An
ordered pair (ξ, η) ∈ Ax × Ay is called a coupled fixed point of (F, f ) if ξ = F(ξ, η) and η = f (ξ, η).
Definition 4. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty subsets of a metric space (X, ρ), F : Ax×Ay → Ax, f : Ax×Ay → Ay. An ordered
pair (ξ, η) ∈ Ax × Ay is called a coupled best proximity point of (F, f ) if ρ(η, F(ξ, η) = ρ(ξ, f (ξ, η) = dist(Ax, Ay).
Definition 5. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty subsets of X. Let F : Ax × Ay → Ax, f : Ax × Ay → Ay. For any pair
(x, y) ∈ Ax × Ay we define the sequences {xn}∞n=0 and {yn}∞n=0 by x0 = x, y0 = y and xn+1 = F(xn, yn), yn+1 = f (xn, yn)
for all n ≥ 0.
Everywhere, when considering the sequences {xn}∞n=0 and {yn}∞n=0 we will assume that they are the sequences
defined in Definition 5.
We will generalized the contraction condition from [1] for the maps, defined in Definition 3 and Definition 4.
Definition 6. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty subsets of a metric space (X, ρ). Let there exist a subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps
F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D. The ordered pair of ordered pairs
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(F, f ) is said to be a cyclic contraction of type one ordered pair if there exist non-negative numbers α, β, such that
max{α + γ, β + δ} < 1 and there holds the inequality
ρ(F(x, y), F(u, v))+ ρ( f (z,w), f (t, s) ≤ αρ(x, u) + βρ(y, v) + γρ(z, t) + δρ(w, s) (1)
for all (x, y), (u, v), (z,w), (t, s) ∈ D.
Definition 7. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty subsets of a metric space (X, ρ). Let there exist a subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps
F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D. The ordered pair of ordered pairs
(F, f ) is said to be a cyclic contraction of type two ordered pair if there exist non-negative numbers α, β, such that
α + β < 1 and there holds the inequality
ρ(F(x, y), f (u, v)) ≤ αρ(x, v) + βρ(y, u) + (1 − (α + β))dist(Ax, Ay) (2)
for all (x, y), (u, v) ∈ D.
The norm–structure of the underlying space plays a crucial role in the proofs [1].
Whenever we deal with a distance in (X, ‖ · ‖), we will always assume that it is generated by the norm ‖ · ‖ i.e.
ρ(x, y) = ‖x − y‖.
The uniformly convexity plays a vital part within the proofs of best proximity points.
Definition 8. Let (X, ‖ · ‖) be a Banach space. For every ε ∈ (0, 2] we define the modulus of convexity of ‖ · ‖ by
δ‖·‖(ε) = inf
{
1 −
∥∥∥∥∥ x + y2
∥∥∥∥∥ : ‖x‖ ≤ 1, ‖y‖ ≤ 1, ‖x − y‖ ≥ ε
}
.
The norm is called uniformly convex if δX(ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ (0, 2]. The space (X, ‖ · ‖) is then called a uniformly convex
space.
Lemma 1. ([1]) Let A be a nonempty closed, convex subset, and B be a nonempty closed subset of a uniformly convex
Banach space. Let {xn}∞n=1 and {zn}∞n=1 be sequences in A and {yn}∞n=1 be a sequence in B satisfying:
1) limn→∞ ‖xn − yn‖ = dist(A, B);
2) limn→∞ ‖zn − yn‖ = dist(A, B);
then limn→∞ ‖xn − zn‖ = 0.
Lemma 2. ([1]) Let A be a nonempty closed, convex subset, and B be a nonempty closed subset of a uniformly convex
Banach space. Let {xn}∞n=1 and {zn}∞n=1 be sequences in A and {yn}∞n=1 be a sequence in B satisfying:
1) limn→∞ ‖zn − yn‖ = dist(A, B);
2) for every ε > 0 there exists N0 ∈ N, such that for all m > n ≥ N0, ‖xn − yn‖ ≤ dist(A, B) + ε,
then for every ε > 0, there exists N1 ∈ N, such that for all m > n > N1, holds ‖xm − zn‖ ≤ ε.
The inequality ∥∥∥∥∥ x + y2 − z
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
(
1 − δX
(
r
R
))
R (3)
holds for any x, y, z ∈ X, R > 0, r ∈ [0, 2R], ‖x − z‖ ≤ R, ‖y − z‖ ≤ R and ‖x − y‖ ≥ r, provided that X is a uniformly
convex [1].
The modulus of convexity δX(ε) is a strictly increasing function, provided that the underlaying space is uniformly
convex, and its inverse function δ−1 exists. If the inequality δ‖·‖(ε) ≥ Cεq holds for some constants C, q > 0 and for
any ε ∈ (0, 2], the modulus of convexity is said to be of power type q. The moduli of convexity with respect to the
p–norm in ℓp or Lp are of power type and the inequalities δ‖·‖p(ε) ≥ ε
p
p2p
for p ≥ 2 and δ‖·‖p(ε) ≥ (p−1)ε
2
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for p ∈ (1, 2)
hold [15].
A comprehensive presenting of the results from this section can be found in [16, 17, 18].
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3. Main Results
3.1. Coupled fixed points
Theorem 1. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty and closed subsets of a complete metric space (X, ρ). Let there exist a closed
subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D. Let
the ordered pair (F, f ) be a cyclic contraction of type one. Then
(I) There exists a unique pair (ξ, η) in D, which is a unique coupled fixed point for the ordered pair (F, f ). Moreover
the iteration sequences {xn}∞n=0 and {yn}∞n=0, defined in Definition 5 converge to ξ and η respectively, for any
arbitrary chosen initial guess (x, y) ∈ Ax × Ay;
(II) a priori error estimates hold max {ρ(xn, ξ), ρ(yn, η)} ≤ kn1−k (ρ(x1, x0) + ρ(y1, y0));
(III) a posteriori error estimates hold max {ρ(xn, ξ), ρ(yn, η)} ≤ k1−k (ρ(xn−1, xn) + ρ(yn−1, yn));
(IV) rate of convergence for the sequences of successive iterations ρ(xn, ξ) + ρ(yn, η) ≤ k (ρ(xn−1, ξ) + (yn−1, η)),
where k = max{α + γ, β + δ}.
Proof: Let us choose an arbitrary point (x, y) ∈ D and {xn}∞n=0, {yn}∞n=0 be the sequences defined in Definition 5.
Then for any n ∈ N there hold the chain of inequalities
ρ(xn+1, xn) + ρ(yn+1, yn) = ρ(F(xn, yn), F(xn−1, yn−1) + ρ( f (xn, yn), f (xn−1, yn−1)
≤ αρ(xn, xn−1) + βρ(yn, yn−1) + γρ(xn, xn−1) + δρ(yn, yn−1)
= (α + γ)ρ(xn, xn−1) + (β + δ)ρ(yn, yn−1) ≤ max{α + γ, β + δ}(ρ(xn, xn−1) + ρ(yn, yn−l)).
Simply to fit a few of the equations within the content field we will denote k = max{α + γ, β + δ}. Consequently
ρ(xn+1, xn) + ρ(yn+1, yn) ≤ kl(ρ(xn+1−l, xn−l) + ρ(yn+1−l, yn−l)). (4)
(I) From (4), applied for l = n we get
max {ρ(xn+1, xn), ρ(yn+1, yn)} ≤ kn(ρ(x1, x0) + ρ(y1, y0)).
Thus
ρ(xn, xn+m) ≤
n+m−1∑
j=n
ρ(x j, x j+1) ≤
n+m−1∑
j=n
k j(ρ(x1, x0) + ρ(y1, y0)) ≤ kn
1 − km
1 − k (ρ(x1, x0) + ρ(y1, y0)). (5)
Since k ∈ (0, 1) it follows that the sequence {xn}∞n=0 is a Cauchy sequence in Ax. Thus {xn} converges to some ξ.
The verification that {yn}∞n=0 converges to some η ∈ Ay can be completed in a similar mold. From the assumption
that D is closed it follows that (ξ, η) ∈ D.
We will prove that the pair (ξ, η) is a coupled fixed point of (F, f ). By the triangle inequality and (1) we get the
inequalities
ρ(ξ, F(ξ, η)) + ρ(η, f (ξ, η)) ≤ ρ(ξ, xn) + ρ(xn, F(ξ, η)) + ρ(η, yn) + ρ(yn, f (ξ, η))
≤ ρ(ξ, xn) + ρ(F(xn−1, yn−1), F(ξ, η)) + ρ(η, yn) + ρ( f (xn−1, yn−1), f (ξ, η))
≤ ρ(ξ, xn) + αρ(xn−1, ξ) + βρ(yn−1, η) + ρ(η, xn) + γρ(xn−1, ξ) + δρ(yn−1, η).
Taking a limit when n → ∞, we get ρ(ξ, F(ξ, η)) + ρ(η, F(η, ξ)) = 0, i.e. ρ(ξ, F(ξ, η)) = 0 and ρ(η, F(η, ξ)) = 0.
Consequently (ξ, η) is a coupled fixed point of (F, f ).
We will prove that (ξ, η) is unique. Let us assume the contrary, i.e. there is (ξ∗, η∗) ∈ D ⊆ Ax × Ay so that
(ξ∗, η∗) , (ξ, η) and ξ∗ = F(ξ∗, η∗), η∗ = f (ξ∗, η∗). The inequalities
ρ(ξ∗, ξ) + ρ(η∗, η) = ρ(F(ξ∗, η∗), F(ξ, η) + ρ( f (η∗, ξ∗), f (η, ξ) ≤ αρ(ξ∗, ξ) + βρ(η∗, η) + γρ(ξ∗, ξ) + δρ(η∗, η)
= (α + γ)ρ(ξ∗, ξ) + (β + δ)ρ(η∗, η) < ρ(ξ∗, ξ) + ρ(η∗, η)
result to ρ(ξ∗, ξ) = ρ(η∗, η) = 0, a contradiction and consequently the coupled fixed point (ξ, η) of (F, f ) is unique .
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(II) Letting m → ∞ in (5) we get the a priori estimate ρ(xn, ξ) ≤ kn1−k (ρ(x1, x0) + ρ(y1, y0)). The proof that
ρ(yn, η) ≤ kn1−k (ρ(x1, x0) + ρ(y1, y0)) is completed by similar arguments. Therefore
max{ρ(xn, ξ), ρ(yn, η)} ≤
kn
1 − k (ρ(x1, x0) + ρ(y1, y0)).
(III) By (4) applied for l = j + 1 we get
ρ(xn, xn+m) ≤
m−1∑
j=0
ρ(xn+ j, xn+ j+1) ≤
m−1∑
j=0
k j+1(ρ(xn−1, xn) + ρ(yn−1, yn)) ≤
k
1 − k (1 − k
m+1)(ρ(xn−1, xn) + ρ(yn−1, yn)).
Letting m → ∞ we get the a posteriori estimate ρ(xn, ξ) ≤ k1−k (ρ(xn−1, xn) + ρ(yn−1, yn)). The proof that ρ(yn, η) ≤
k
1−k (ρ(xn−1, xn) + ρ(yn−1, yn)) is done in a similar fashion and thus
max{ρ(xn, ξ), ρ(yn, η)} ≤
k
1 − k (ρ(xn−1, xn) + ρ(yn−1, yn)).
IV) Considering that the pair (ξ, η) is a coupled fixed point for (F, f ) and (1) we have the inequalities
ρ(xn, ξ) + ρ(yn, η) = ρ(F(xn−1, yn−1), F(ξ, η)) + ρ( f (xn−1, yn−1), f (ξ, η))
≤ αρ(xn−1, ξ) + βρ(yn−1, η) + γρ(xn−1, ξ) + δρ(yn−1, η)
= (α + γ)ρ(xn−1, ξ) + (β + δ)ρ(yn−1, η) ≤ k(ρ(xn−1, ξ) + ρ(yn−1, η)).
Consequently ρ(xn, ξ) + ρ(yn, η) ≤ k(ρ(xn−1, ξ) + ρ(yn−1, η)). 
3.2. Coupled best proximity points
Simply to fit a few of the equations within the content field let us denote d = dist(Ax, Ay), Pn,m(x, y) = ‖xn − ym‖
andWn,m(x, y) = Pn,m(x, y) − d = ‖xn − ym‖ − d, where x = {xn}∞n=0 and y = {yn}∞n=0.
Lemma 3. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty subsets of a metric space (X, ρ). Let there exist a subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps
F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D. Let the ordered pair (F, f ) be a
cyclic contraction of type two. Then there holds limn→∞ ρ(xn, yn+k) = d and limn→∞ ρ(xn+k, yn) = d for an arbitrary
chosen (x, y) ∈ D and arbitrary k = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
Proof: Let us choose an arbitrary (x, y) ∈ D and define {xn}∞n=0, {yn}∞n=0
Using the cyclic contraction condition (2) we get that for all n, k ∈ N holds
ρ(xn+1, yn+1+k) = ρ (F(xn, yn+k), f (xn+k, yn+k)) ≤ αρ(xn, yn+k) + βρ(yn+k, xn) + (1 − (α + β))d
= (α + β)ρ(xn, yn+k) + (1 − (α + β))d
Thus we get
ρ(xn+1, yn+1+k) − d ≤ (α + β)(ρ(xn, yn+k) − d) ≤ (α + β)2(ρ(xn−1, yn−1+k) − d)
≤ (α + β)3(ρ(xn−2, yn−1+k)) − d) ≤ · · · ≤ (α + β)n+1(ρ(x0, yk) − d)). (6)
For any arbitrary and fixed k ∈ N, after taking limit in (6), when n → ∞, by using the assumption that α + β ∈ (0, 1),
we get limn→∞(ρ(xn+1, yn+1+k) − d) = 0 and thus we obtain limn→∞ ρ(xn+1, yn+1+k) = d.
The proof of limn→∞ ρ(xn+k, yn) = d can be done in a similar fashion. 
It can be seen easily that (6) holds for indexesm > n, too.
ρ(xn, ym) − d ≤ (α + β)n(ρ(x0, ym−n) − d). (7)
Lemma 4. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty subsets of a metric space (X, ρ). Let there exist a subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps
F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, so that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D. Let the ordered pair (F, f ) be a cyclic
contraction of type two. The iterrative sequences {xn}∞n=0 and {yn}∞n=0, for any initial guess (x, y) ∈ D are bounded.
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Proof: Let (x, y) ∈ D be arbitrary chosen and fixed. From Lemma 3 we have that limn→∞ ρ(xn, yn) = d and thus it
will be sufficient to demonstra that only {xn}∞n=0 is a bounded sequence.
Let as choose
M >
(1 − (α + β)2)d + (α + β)2(ρ(y0, x2) + ρ(x2, y2))
1 − (α + β)2 .
Suppose the contrary, i.e. {xn}∞n=0 is not bounded. Then there exists n0 ∈ N, such that there hold ρ(y2, xn) ≤ M for all
n < n0 and
ρ(y2, xn0) > M. (8)
From inequality (8) after a substitution in (7) with n = 2 and m = n0 we get
M − d
(α + β)2
<
ρ(y2, xn0) − d
(α + β)2
≤ ρ(y0, xn0−2) − d ≤ ρ(y0, x2) + ρ(x2, y2) + ρ(y2, xn0−2) − d
≤ ρ(y0, x2) + ρ(x2, y2) + M − d,
which inequality can hold true only if the inequality M ≤ (1 − (α + β)
2)d + (α + β)2(ρ(y0, x2) + ρ(x2, y2))
1 − (α + β)2 holds,
which contradicts with the choice of M. 
Lemma 5. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty convex subsets of a uniformly convex Banach space (X, ‖ · ‖). Let there exist a
subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D. Let
the ordered pair (F, f ) be a cyclic contraction of type two. For any arbitrary chosen (x, y) ∈ D and for every ε > 0
there is n0 ∈ N so that the inequality ‖xm − yn‖ < d + ε holds for any m ≥ n > n0.
Proof: From Lemma 3 we get limn→∞ ‖xn − yn‖ = d and limn→∞ ‖xn+1 − yn‖ = d.
By Lemma 1 after using the uniform convexity of (X, ‖ · ‖) it follows that
lim
n→∞
‖xn − xn+1‖ = 0. (9)
By similar argument we get that limn→∞ ‖yn − yn+1‖ = 0.
Let us suppose that there exists ε > 0 with the property: for any j ∈ N there are m j ≥ n j ≥ j so that
‖xm j − yn j‖ ≥ d + ε.
Let us choose m j to be the smallest integer so that the last inequality is satisfied, i.e.there holds
‖xm j − yn j‖ ≥ d + ε and ‖xm j−1 − yn j‖ < d + ε.
Thus we get
d + ε ≤ ‖xm j − yn j‖ ≤ ‖xm j − xm j−1‖ + ‖xm j−1 − yn j‖ < ‖xm j − xm j−1‖ + d + ε. (10)
Letting j → ∞ in (10) by using (9) we get lim j→∞ ‖xm j − yn j+1‖ = d + ε. Using the boundedness of {xn}∞n=0 and {yn}∞n=0
we get the existence of M ≥ d, so that the inequality M ≥ ‖x0 − ym j−n j‖ holds for every j ∈ N. The inequality
‖xm j − yn j‖ − d ≤ (α + β)n j (‖x0 − ym j−n j‖ − d) ≤ (α + β)n j (M − d)
holds. For any ε > 0 we can find j0 ∈ N to hold (α + β) j(M − d) < ε for every j ≥ j0. Therefore for any m j ≥ n j ≥ j0
there holds ‖xm j − xn j‖ < d + ε, which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 6. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty convex subsets of a uniformly convex Banach space (X, ‖ · ‖). Let there exist a
subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D. Let
the ordered pair (F, f ) be a cyclic contraction of type two. For an arbitrary chosen (x, y) ∈ D the sequences {xn}∞n=0
and {yn}∞n=0 are Cauchy.
Proof: We will prove that {xn}∞n=0 is a Cauchy sequence. The proof for {yn}∞n=0 is similar. By Lemma 5 we have
that for every ε > 0 there is n0 ∈ N, so that for all m ≥ n ≥ n0 holds the inequality ‖xm − yn‖ < d + ε.
By Lemma 3 we get limn→∞ ‖xn − yn‖ = d. According to Lemma 2 it follows that for every ε > 0 there is N0 ∈ N,
so that for all m > n ≥ N0 holds the inequality ‖xm − xn‖ < ε and consequently {xn}∞n=0 is a Cauchy sequence. 
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Lemma 7. Let Ax, Aybe nonempty subsets of a uniformly convex Banach space (X, ‖ · ‖). Let there exist a subset
D ⊆ Ax ×Ay and maps F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, so that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D and the ordered
pair (F, f ) be a cyclic contraction of type two. Then for an arbitrary chosen (x, y) ∈ D and for any 1 ≤ l ≤ n there
hold the inequalities ‖xn − yn‖ ≤ (α + β)lWn−l,n−l(x, y) + d.
Proof. Using Lemma 3 we getWn,n(x, y) ≤ (α + β)Wn−1,n−1(x, y) and thus ‖xn − yn‖ ≤ (α + β)lWn−l,n−l(x, y) + d.
Lemma 8. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty closed and convex subsets of a uniformly convex Banach space (X, ‖ · ‖). Let there
exist a subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that (F(x, y), f (x, y) ⊆ D and the ordered
pair (F, f ) be a cyclic contraction of type two. Then for an arbitrary chosen (x, y) ∈ D there holds the inequalities
δ‖·‖
( ‖xn+1 − xn‖
d + (α + β)lUn−l(x, y)
)
≤ (α + β)
lUn−l(x, y)
d + (α + β)lUn−l(x, y)
, δ‖·‖
( ‖yn+1 − yn‖
d + (α + β)lUn−l(y, x)
)
≤ (α + β)
lUn−l(y, x)
d + (α + β)lUn−l(y, x)
,
where Un(x, y) = max{Wn,n+1(x, y),Wn,n(x, y)} = max{‖xn − yn+1‖ − d, ‖xn − yn‖ − d}.
Proof. Using Lemma 7 we obtain
‖xn − yn+1‖ ≤ d + (α + β)lWn−l,n+1−l(x, y) ≤ d + (α + β)lmax{Wn−l,n+1−l(x, y),Wn−l,n−l(x, y)}
‖yn+1 − xn+1‖ ≤ d + (α + β)l+1Wn−l,n−l(x, y) ≤ d + (α + β)lmax{Wn−l,n+1−l(x, y),Wn−l,n−l(x, y)}.
Then
‖xn+1 − xn‖ ≤ ‖xn+1 − yn‖ + ‖yn − xn‖ ≤ 2
(
d + (α + β)lmax{Wn−l,n+1−l(x, y),Wn−l,n−l(x, y)}
)
= 2
(
d + (α + β)lUn−l,n−l(x, y)
)
.
After a substitution in (3) with x = xn, y = yn, z = xn+1, R = d + (α + β)
lmax{Wn−l,n+1−l(x, y),Wn−l,n−l(x, y)} and
r = ‖xn+1 − xn‖ and from the convexity of Ax we obtain the inequalities
d ≤
∥∥∥∥∥ xn + xn+12 − yn
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
(
1 − δ‖·‖
( ‖xn − xn+1‖
d + (α + β)lUn−l,n−l(x, y)
)) (
d + (α + β)lUn−l,n−l(x, y)
)
. (11)
Thereafter the inequality δ‖·‖
( ‖xn+1−xn‖
d+(α+β)lUn−l,n−l (x,y)
)
≤ (α+β)lUn−l,n−l (x,y)
d+(α+β)lUn−l,n−l(x,y)
holds.
Theorem 2. Let Ax, Ay be nonempty, closed and convex subsets of a uniformly convex Banach space (X, ‖·‖). Let there
exist a closed and convex subset D ⊆ Ax×Ay and maps F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that (F(x, y), f (x, y) ⊆ D for
every (x, y) ∈ D. Let the ordered pair (F, f ) be a cyclic contraction of type two. Then (F, f ) has a unique coupled best
proximity point (ξ, η) ∈ Ax × Ay, (i.e. ‖η− F(ξ, η)‖ = ‖ξ− f (ξ, η)‖ = d). For any arbitrary initial guess (x, y) ∈ Ax × Ay
there hold limn→∞ xn = ξ, limn→∞ yn = η, ‖ξ − η‖ = d, ξ = F(ξ, η) and η = f (ξ, η).
If in addition (X, ‖ · ‖) has a modulus of convexity of power type with constants C > 0 and q > 1, then
(i) a priori error estimates hold
‖ξ − xm‖ ≤ M0 q
√
max{W0,1(x, y),W0,0(x, y)}
Cd
·
q
√
(α + β)m
1 − q√α + β ; ‖η − ym‖ ≤ N0
q
√
max{W0,1(y, x),W0,0(y, x)}
Cd
·
q
√
(α + β)m
1 − q√α + β ;
(ii) a posteriori error estimates hold
‖ξ − xn‖ ≤ Mn−1 q
√
max{Wn−1,n(x, y),Wn−1,n−1(x, y)}
Cd
c; ‖η − yn‖ ≤ Nn−1 q
√
max{Wn−1,n(y, x),Wn−1,n−1(y, x)}
Cd
c,
where Mn = max{‖xn − yn‖, ‖xn − yn+1‖}, Nn = max{‖xn − yn‖, ‖yn − xn+1‖} and c =
q
√
α+β
1− q√α+β .
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Proof. For any initial guess (x, y) ∈ D it follows from Lemma 6 that {xn}∞n=0 and {yn}∞n=0 are Cauchy sequences. From
the assumptions that (X, ‖·‖) is a Banach space and D is closed it follows that there are (ξ, η) ∈ D, so that limn→∞ xn = ξ
and limn→∞ yn = η.
From the inequalities by using the continuity of the norm function ‖ · − · ‖ and Lemma 3 we have
‖ξ − η‖ − d = lim
n→∞
‖xn − yn‖ − d = lim
n→∞
‖F(xn−1, yn−1) − f (xn−1, yn−1)‖ − d
≤ lim
n→∞
(α‖xn−1 − yn−1‖ + β‖yn−1 − xn−1‖) − (α + β)d = lim
n→∞
(α + β) (‖xn−1 − yn−1‖ − d) = 0.
Thus ‖ξ − η‖ = d.
From the inequalities by using the continuity of the norm function ‖ · − · ‖ and Lemma 3 we have
‖ξ − f (ξ, η)‖ − d = lim
n→∞
‖xn+1 − f (ξ, η)‖ − d = lim
n→∞
‖F(xn, yn) − f (ξ, η)‖ − d
≤ lim
n→∞
(α‖xn − η‖ + β‖yn − ξ‖) − (α + β)d = (α + β) (‖ξ − η‖ − d) = 0.
Thus ‖ξ − f (ξ, η)‖ = d. From ‖ξ − η‖ = d, according to Lemma 1 it follows that η = f (ξ, η).
From the inequalities by using the continuity of the norm function ‖ · − · ‖ and Lemma 3 have
‖η − F(ξ, η)‖ − d = lim
n→∞
‖yn+1 − F(ξ, η)‖ − d = lim
n→∞
‖ f (xn, yn) − F(ξ, η)‖ − d
≤ lim
n→∞
(α‖xn − η‖ + β‖yn − ξ‖) − (α + β)d = (α + β) (‖ξ − η‖ − d) = 0.
Thus ‖η − F(ξ, η)‖ = d. From ‖ξ − η‖ = d, according to Lemma 1 it follows that ξ = F(ξ, η).
We will prove that the coupled best proximity points are unique.
Let us suppose that there exists (ξ∗, η∗), such that ‖η∗−F(ξ∗, η∗)‖ = ‖ξ∗− f (ξ∗, η∗)‖ = d and ‖ξ− ξ∗‖+ ‖η−η∗‖ > 0.
From (2) we get the inequality
‖F(F(ξ∗, η∗), f (ξ∗, η∗)) − f (ξ∗, η∗)‖ ≤ α‖η∗ − F(ξ∗, η∗)‖ + β‖ξ∗ − f (ξ∗, η∗)‖ + (1 − (α + β))d
= αd + βd + (1 − (α + β))d = d
From ‖ξ∗ − f (ξ∗, η∗)‖ = d, according to Lemma 1 it follow that ξ∗ = F(F(ξ∗, η∗), f (ξ∗, η∗)). By analogous arguments
we get that η∗ = f (F(ξ∗, η∗), f (ξ∗, η∗)). Let us suppose that ‖ξ∗ − η∗‖ > d, then
‖ξ∗ − η∗‖ = ‖F(F(ξ∗, η∗), f (ξ∗, η∗)) − f (F(ξ∗, η∗), f (ξ∗, η∗))‖
≤ (α + β)‖F(ξ∗, η∗) − f (ξ∗, η∗)‖ + (1 − (α + β))d
≤ (α + β)2‖ξ∗ − η∗‖ + (1 − (α + β))(1 + (α + β))d
< (α + β)2‖ξ∗ − η∗‖ + (1 − (α + β))(1 + (α + β))‖ξ∗ − η∗‖ < ‖ξ∗ − η∗‖,
(12)
a contradiction and thus ‖ξ∗ − η∗‖ = d. Using that ‖η∗ − F(ξ∗, η∗)‖ = ‖ξ∗ − f (ξ∗, η∗)‖ = d and Lemma 1 we get that
η∗ = f (ξ∗, η∗) and ξ∗ = F(ξ∗, η∗). Let us suppose that d < max{‖η − ξ∗‖, ‖ξ − η∗‖}. Then
‖ξ∗ − η‖ = ‖F(ξ∗, η∗) − f (ξ, η)‖ ≤ α‖η − ξ∗‖ + β‖ξ − η∗‖ + (1 − (α + β))d
< α‖η − ξ∗‖ + β‖ξ − η∗‖ + (1 − (α + β))β‖ξ − η
∗‖ + α‖η − ξ∗‖
α + β
=
β‖ξ − η∗‖ + α‖η − ξ∗‖
α + β
.
(13)
By similar arguments we get
‖ξ − η∗‖ = ‖F(ξ, η) − f (ξ∗, η∗)‖ ≤ α‖ξ − η∗‖ + β‖η − ξ∗‖ + (1 − (α + β))d
< α‖ξ − η∗‖ + β‖η − ξ∗‖ + (1 − (α + β))α‖ξ − η
∗‖ + β‖η − ξ∗‖
α + β
=
α‖ξ − η∗‖ + β‖η − ξ∗‖
α + β
.
(14)
After summing (13) and (14) we get
‖ξ∗ − η‖ + ‖ξ − η∗‖ < ‖ξ − η∗‖ + ‖η − ξ∗‖, (15)
a contradiction, i.e. d = ‖η − ξ∗‖ = ‖ξ − η∗‖. From Lemma 2, ‖η − ξ‖ = d we obtain that ξ∗ = ξ and η∗ = η.
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(i) The Uniform convexity of X ensures that δ‖·‖ is strictly increasing and therefore its inverse function δ−1‖·‖ exists
and is strictly increasing. By Lemma 8 we have
‖xn − xn+1‖ ≤
(
d + (α + β)lUn−l(x, y)
)
δ−1‖·‖
(
(α + β)lUn−l(x, y)
d + (α + β)lUn−l(x, y)
)
. (16)
By the inequality δ‖·‖(t) ≥ Ctq it follows that δ−1‖·‖(t) ≤
(
t
C
)1/q
. From (16) and the inequalities
d ≤ d + (α + β)lUn−l(x, y) ≤ max{Pn−l,n−l(x, y), Pn−l,n−l+1(x, y)}
we obtain
‖xn − xn+1‖ ≤
(
d + (α + β)lUn−l(x, y)
)
q
√
(α + β)lUn−l(x, y)
C
(
d + (α + β)lUn−l(x, y)
)
≤ max{Pn−l,n−l(x, y), Pn−l,n−l+1(x, y)} q
√
Un−l(x, y)
Cd
q
√
(α + β)l.
(17)
We have proven the existance of a unique pair (ξ, η) ∈ Ax × Ay, so that ‖ξ − F(ξ, η)‖ = d, where ξ is a limit of
{xn}∞n=1 for any (x, y) ∈ Ax × Ay.
After a substitution with l = n in (17) we get the inequality
∞∑
n=1
‖xn − xn+1‖ ≤ max{‖x0 − y0‖, ‖x0 − y1‖} q
√
U0(x, y)
Cd
∞∑
n=1
q
√
(α + β)n
= max{‖x0 − y0‖, ‖x0 − y1‖} q
√
U0(x, y)
Cd
·
q
√
α + β
1 − q√α + β
and consequently the series
∑∞
n=1(xn − xn+1) is absolutely convergent. Consequently for any m ∈ N there holds
ξ = xm −
∑∞
n=m (xn − xn+1) and therefore we get the inequality
‖ξ − xm‖ ≤
∞∑
n=m
‖xn − xn+1‖ ≤ max{‖x0 − y0‖, ‖x0 − y1‖} q
√
U0(x, y)
Cd
·
q
√
(α + β)m
1 − q√α + β .
The proof for ‖η − ym‖ can be done in a comparative mold.
(ii) Simply to fit some formulas in the text field we put Mn = max{‖xn − yn‖, ‖xn − yn+1‖}. After substituting in (17)
with l = 1 + i we get
‖xn+i − xn+i+1‖ ≤ Mn−1 q
√
Un−1(x, y)
Cd
(
q
√
α + β
)1+i
. (18)
From (18) we get that there holds the inequality
‖xn − xn+m‖ ≤
m−1∑
i=0
‖xn+i − xn+i+1‖ ≤
m−1∑
i=0
Mn−1
q
√
Un−1(x, y)
Cd
q
√
(α + β)1+i
= Mn−1
q
√
Un−1(x, y)
Cd
m−1∑
i=0
q
√
(α + β)1+i = Mn−1
q
√
Un−1(x, y)
Cd
· 1 −
q
√
(α + β)m
1 − q√α + β
q
√
(α + β),
(19)
and after letting m → ∞ in (19) we obtain the inequality
‖xn − ξ‖ ≤ max{‖xn−1 − yn−1‖, ‖xn−1 − yn‖} q
√
Un−1(x, y)
Cd
q
√
α + β
1 − q√α + β .
By similar technique we can proof ‖yn − η‖.
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4. Oligopoly (Duopoly) Markets
Markets dominated by a small number of players are getting more common than ever. This process has been fueled
by industry consolidation, rise in international expansion and natural desire to benefit from economies in scale, all
resulting in a number of mergers and acquisitions that leave few companies dominating a particular market. Cournot
in 1838 in in [8] was the first to build a complete model of a market where few players control the price and supply
quantity of the goods being traded. The original model is able to correctly estimate equilibrium conditions provided
that market participants comply with the following requirements:
(i) there are two players each with sufficient market power to affect the price of the goods being sold;
(ii) there is no product differentiation;
(iii) decisions on production output are taken simultaneously;
(iv) there is no cooperation between market participants and each one reacts in a rational way, seeking to maximize
its profit.
If the two companies are not necessarily rational, a different solution can be found as for example in [19, 20].
Cournot’s approach is known nowadays as a static oligopoly model, which means that each company, participating
in the oligopoly market considers the production of others to remain fixed at least for a given period of time, i.e. player
i assumes that in time t the other participants produce the quantities that they have produced in time t − 1. In the
dynamic case, each company attempts to guess what change of production the other players will make in time t [21].
The Cournot’s duopoly model can be divided into two kinds - symmetric and asymmetric one [22]. In the latter
case we consider an efficient company and a less-efficient one, producing a homogeneous good. Both are asymmetric
in terms of their pre–innovation production costs. While both companiesmay have a fixed marginal cost of production,
the efficient one has a lower cost c1, and the less-efficient one has a higher cost c2 - where c1 < c2. Companies still
compete in quantities, as in Cournot’s duopoly. In the symmetric case both firms are equally efficient. It is important to
note under which case a particular market falls, because asymmetric oligopoly may also end up dealing with products
that are similar but of different quality. This is a question that falls beyond the scope of our study and we shall assume
that there is no significant difference in the quality characteristics of the products produced and sold by each market
participant.
Considering the demand, there are two distinct cases that have to be analyzed:
(i) Demand is known and does not change. In this case the Cournot’s duopoly solution applies as it is.
(ii) Demand may change over time. In case case it is possible to reach a situation in which there is uncertainty about
market equilibrium - as in [23].
We analyze a special case of Cournot’s duopoly in which the participating companies face different market demand
in each of scenarios.
A generalization of Cournot’s model is the Stackelberg duopoly [24], where one firm is a leader and the other is
a follower. This model is applicable when firms choose their output sequentially and not simultaneously. Cournot’s
model and equilibrium are in fact the direct predecessor of Nash’s equilibrium point. Bertrand has introduced another
kind of a duopoly model, where firms compete on prices rather than on outputs.
Contemporary markets can be subject to different regulations and barriers. Thus there are constraints applicable
that influence the stability of market equilibrium and time required to reach it. We can summarize these constraints
as:
(i) The number of market participants;
Starting with the duopoly case in the Cournots seminal work [8] it is important to take into account the scalability
of suggested solutions, due to the fact that there are various market structures in contemporary economics with
high concentration and limited number of players.
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(ii) The interdependence, availability, and access to information;
Companies operating in an environment with high concentration ratios (as measured by share of the largest
participants compared to the total market volume) cannot take decisions in a completely isolated way. They
need to take into account the effects their decisions have on the other participants, as well as their imminent
reaction.
(iii) The price and non-price competition terms;
In order to account for the actual behavior of companies operating under oligopoly markets, it is necessary to
take into consideration the non-price competition. In some cases, product differentiation may not exist (for
example in the case of raw materials) but there may be loyalty schemes or aggressive advertisement campaigns
that affect the equilibrium in indirect way.
(iv) Consistency of behavior and time dependence of market conditions;
Solutions that consider time-dependency of company behavior and market changes [25, 26] are better able to
describe contemporary oligopoly markets.
(v) Market entry and exit barriers;
Entry and exit barriers can directly influence the number of companies operating on the oligopoly market. They
also play important role in shaping the decisions of each participant as barriers can be considered as additional
limiting/boundary conditions.
(vi) Goals and profit maximization behavior;
We assume that profit maximization is the sole purpose of all market participants in the oligopoly markets. It
is possible that there are periods of time, or even specific markets in which this is not the case (for example as
described in [27]) and the resulting equilibrium is different. In a long term economic agents would need to go
back to profit maximization as they may be otherwise subject to acquisition or change in management.
(vii) Linear and non-linear changes in market conditions and firm behavior.
Taking into consideration these critical factors is very important in order to create formal description of oligopoly
markets that is adequate to reality we live in.
Restraints could emerge as milestones at every production stage, at a different scale, size and intensity. Moreover,
each of the restraints could influence other, in a different direction and with different strength, and in parallel they
could be influenced by the introduced production system and the existing market environment. The market is a vital
substance, and the environment in which it functions and breathes would challenge the play of both actors, and could
perform various scenarios of their action. Hence, these influences could affect the preliminary set up goals and price-
polices of each of the observed players.
4.1. Modeling real-world oligopoly markets
Let us consider two companies that offer identical goods or services. These could range from health–care in a
specific region to simple grocery delivery in a neighborhood. While the assumption for having homogeneous goods
is quite restrictive, it helps to start with a simple model and then extend it by adding non-price competition and brand
loyalty, to name a few extra factors. In support of the approach we have used, it should be noted that oligopoly markets
with heterogeneous goods can be analyzed with the same instruments as the ones we employ. The only requirements
is to define and estimate parameters of the response function of each market participant. In case of identical goods it
is much easier to do this. For complex products that include a variety of factors, such as positioning through non-price
attributes, response functions may be harder to define and often composite ones.
To investigate the existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium we employ game theory terminology. This is
supported by the notion that, company profits depend on its own output, as well as on the production of the other mar-
ket participants. Under duopoly markets the result fits naturally into game theory basic cases of strategic interaction.
Thus the static Cournot’s oligopoly is a fully rational game, based on the following assumptions:
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(i) each company, in taking its optimal production decision rationally, must know before hand all its rival’s produc-
tion and both firms should take their decisions simultaneously;
(ii) each firm has a perfect knowledge of the market demand function.
The dynamic model is a game in which case restrictive assumption (i) is replaced by some kind of expectation on
the rivals’ outputs. While the simplest way is to use naive expectation that production or each market participant will
remain at its most recent level, it is also possible to impose more realistic views as in [28, 29]. As a starting point,
lets consider a situation in which there are two players ”A“ and ”B“ producing at moment n + 1 goods F(xn, yn) and
f (xn, yn), provided that at moment n they have produced xn and yn respectively. Such general notation does not yet
imply anything regarding market participants. Depending on the functions F(xn, yn) and f (xn, yn) the model can be
static or dynamic, as well as symmetric or asymmetric.
However in order to have market equilibrium, the pair (x, y) should satisfy the equations x = F(x, y) and y =
f (x, y).
Thus we will search for sufficient conditions, depending only on the response functions, that will ensure the
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium pair. Compared to the classical approaches in oligopoly markets, this way
has several important advantages:
• it is possible to account for protective capacity present in contemporary production environments, which allows
to have minimal (or even zero) marginal costs within some output ranges;
• it is possible to assess whether marker can reach equilibrium, regardless of the initial position;
• and finally it is possible to assess time necessary to reach equilibrium and whether this situation can remain
stable.
An extensive study on the oligopoly markets can be found in [30, 31, 32, 33].
4.2. The basic model
Let us first start with a duopoly model [9, 10] - two companies competing for same consumers and striving to
meet the demand with overall production of Z = x + y. The market price is defined as P(Z) = P(x + y), which is
the inverse of the demand function. Market players have cost functions c1(x) and c2(y), respectively. Assuming that
both firms are acting rationally, the profit functions are Π1(x, y) = xP(x + y) − c1(x) and Π2(x, y) = yP(x + y) − c2(y)
of the first and the second firm, respectively. The goal of each company is to maximize its profit, i.e. max{Π1(x, y) :
x, assuming that y is fixed} and max{Π2(x, y) : y, assuming that x is fixed}. Provided that functions P and ci, i = 1, 2
are differentiable, we get the equations∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂Π1(x,y)
∂x
= P(x + y) + xP′(x + y) − c′
1
(x) = 0
∂Π2(x,y)
∂y
= P(x + y) + yP′(x + y) − c′
2
(y) = 0.
(20)
The solution of (20) presents the equilibrium pair of production in the duopoly market [9, 10]. Often equations
(20) have solutions in the form of x = b1(y) and y = b2(x), which are called response functions [9].
It may turn out difficult or impossible to solve (20) thus it is often advised to search for an approximate solution.
Another drawback, when searching of an approximate solution is that it may be not stable. Fortunately we can find an
implicit formula for the response function in (20) i.e. x =
c′
1
(x)−P(x+y)
P′(x+y) = F(x, y) and y =
c′
2
(y)−P(x+y)
P′(x+y) = f (x, y) .
It is still possible that we may end up with response functions, that do not lead to maximization of the profit Π.
As it is often assumed, each participant response depends its own production level and that of the pother payers. E.g.
if at a moment n the output quantities are (xn, yn), and the first player changes its productions to xn+1 = F(xn, yn),
then the second one will also change its output to yn+1 = f (xn, yn). The iterated sequence {(xn, yn)}∞n=1 are defined in
Definition 5. We have an equilibrium if there are two productions x and y, such that x = F(x, y) and y = f (x, y). The
functionsΠi are called payoff functions. To ensure that the solutions of (20) will present a maximization of the payoff
functions a sufficient condition is that Πi be concave functions [30, 31, 33], by using of response function we alter the
maximization problem into a coupled fixed point one thus all assumptions of concavity and differentiability can be
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skipped. The problem of solving the equations x = F(x, y) and y = f (x, y) is the problem of finding of coupled fixed
points for an ordered pair of maps (F, f ) [2]. Yet an important limitation may be that players cannot change output
too fast and thus the player may not perform maximize their profits.
Focusing on response functions, allows to put together Cournot and Bertand models. Indeed let the first company
have reaction be F(X, Y) and the second one f (X, Y), where X = (x, p) and Y = (y, q). Here x and y denote the
output quantity and (p, q) are the prices set by players. In this case companies can compete in terms of both price and
quantity.
5. Application of the Main Results in Duopoly Markets
In case of two major players taking all or most of the market, we need to consider special cases depending on
intersection of production set. The situation in which production sets of both companies have an empty intersection
may seem extreme, but it is not impossible. For example if one of the companies is working at a very large scale it may
simply be impractical to sustain a low level of output. On the other hand, if the company is just too small to undertake
large projects it may also happen that expanding its production beyond certain limit is not feasible. Therefore, it is
possible that long term contracts or technical issues prohibit certain type of actions and impose special limitations.
The mathematical justifications of the results is presented in the Appendix section.
5.1. Players’ production sets have a nonempty intersection
Assumption 1. Let there is a duopoly market, satisfying the following assumptions:
(1) The two firms are producing homogeneous goods that are perfect substitutes.
(2) The first firm can produce qualities from the set Ax and the second firm can produce qualities from the set Ay,
where Ax and Ay be closed, nonempty subsets of a complete metric space (X, ρ)
(3) Let there exist a closed subset D ⊆ Ax×Ay and maps F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D
for every (x, y) ∈ D, be the response functions for firm one and two respectively
(4) Let there exist α, β, γ, δ > 0, max{α + γ, β + δ} < 1, such that the inequality
ρ(F(x, y), F(u, v))+ ρ( f (z,w), f (t, s)) ≤ αρ(x, u) + βρ(y, v) + γρ(z, t) + δρ(w, s) (21)
holds for all (x, y), (u, v), (z,w), (t, s) ∈ Ax × Ay.
Then
(I) There exists a unique pair (ξ, η) in D, satisfying ξ = F(ξ, η) and η = f (ξ, η), i.e. a market equilibrium pair.
Moreover the iteration sequences {xn}∞n=0 and {yn}∞n=0 converge to ξ and η, respectively.
(II) a priori error estimates hold max {ρ(xn, ξ), ρ(yn, η)} ≤ kn1−k (ρ(x1, x0) + ρ(y1, y0));
(III) a posteriori error estimates hold max {ρ(xn, ξ), ρ(yn, η)} ≤ k1−k (ρ(xn−1, xn) + ρ(yn−1, yn));
(IV) The rate of convergence for the sequences of successive iterations is ρ(xn, ξ)+ρ(yn, η) ≤ k (ρ(xn−1, ξ) + (yn−1, η)),
where k = max{α + γ, β + δ}.
The proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 1.
Let us consider a duopoly market. Let the two firms produce qualities from the set Ax and the second firm can
produce qualities from the set Ay, where Ax and Ay be nonempty subsets of a complete metric space (X, ρ). Any of the
firms can produce a bundle of products x = (x1, x2, . . . xn) ∈ X. Assumption 1 ensures the existence and uniqueness
of the production bundles (x1, x2, . . . xn), (y1, y2, . . . yn) ∈ X of n–goods, that present the equilibrium in a duopoly
economy.
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5.1.1. A linear case, when each player is producing a single product, goods being perfect substitutes
Let us consider a market with two competing firms, each firm producing just one product, and both goods are
perfect substitutes. Let the two firms produce quantities x ∈ Ax and y ∈ Ay, respectively, where Ax, Ay ⊂ [0,+∞) and
(X, ρ) be the complete metric space (R, |·|). Let us consider the response functions of player one F(x, y) = a−s−px−qy
and player two f (x, y) = a − r − µy − νx, where
(1) a, s, r, p, q, µ, ν > 0, s < a, r < a, max{p + µ, q + ν} < 1
(2) Ax =
[
0, a−s
p
]
∩
[
0, a−r
µ
]
and Ay =
[
0, a−s
q
]
∩
[
0, a−r
ν
]
(3) D can be defined in three ways:
(3a) D =
[
0,
aµ−aq−sµ−qr
µp−νq
]
×
[
0,
ap−aν+sν−pr
µp−νq
]
, provided that a − s ≤ aµ−aq−sµ−qr
µp−νq and a − r ≤
ap−aν+sν−pr
µp−νq
(3b) D = [0, a − s] × [0, a − r], provided that µr + νs − aµ − aν + a − r > 0 and ps + qr − ap − aq + a − s > 0
(3c) D =

0 ≤ x ≤ a − s
p
0 ≤ y ≤ a − r − µx
ν
.
It is easy to check that F : D ⊂ Ax × Ay → Ax, f : D ⊂ Ax × Ay → Ay and (F(D), f (D)) ⊆ D.
Indeed let us consider case (3a). From the assumptions that a, s, r, p, q, µ, ν > 0 we get
F(x, y) ≤ F(0, 0) = a − s ≤ aµ − aq + sµ − qr
µp − νq , F(x, y) ≥ F
(
aµ − aq + sµ − qr
µp − νq ,
ap − aν + sν − pr
µp − νq
)
= 0,
and
f (x, y) ≤ f (0, 0) = a − r ≤ ap − aν + sν − pr
µp − νq , f (x, y) ≥ f
(
aµ − aq + sµ − qr
µp − νq ,
ap − aν + sν − pr
µp − νq
)
= 0.
Therefore F : D → Ax, f : D → Ay and (F(D), f (D)) ⊆ D.
It can be proven in a similar fashion that (F(D), f (D)) ⊆ D and for the cases (3b) and (3c).
From the inequalities |F(x, y) − F(u, v)| = |p(x − u) + q(y − v)| ≤ p|x − u| + q|y − v| and | f (z,w) − f (t, s)| =
|µ(z − t) + ν(w − s)| ≤ µ|z − t| + ν|w − s| it follows that
|F(x, y) − F(u, v)| + | f (z,w) − f (t, s)| ≤ p|x − u| + q|y − v| + µ|z − t| + ν|w − s|
and thus the ordered pair (F, f ) satisfies Assumption 1 with constants α = p, β = q, γ = µ, δ = ν, because
max{p + µ, q + ν} < 0. Consequently there exists an equilibrium pair (x, y) and for any initial start in the economy
the iterated sequences (xn, yn) converge to the market equilibrium (x, y). The equilibrium pair is x =
aµ−aq−sµ+qr+a−s
µp−νq+µ+p+1 ,
y =
ap−aν+sν−pr−a+r
µp−νq+µ+p+1 . Let us consider a particular case: a = 100, s = 20, r = 30, p =
1
2
, q = 1
8
, µ = 1
3
, ν = 1
6
.
Values selected for this case are arbitrarily chosen with only general conditions in mind. However in actual situation
he values of p, q, µ and ν reflect the actual management and marketing policy of the market participants. In this case
F(x, y) = 80 − x
2
− y
8
, f (x, y) = 70 − x
3
− y
6
, Ax = [0, 210], Ay = [0, 320]. The subset D can be considered either
D = [0, 110]× [0, 200] (3a) or D = {0 ≤ x ≤ 160, 0 ≤ y ≤ 420 − 2x} (3c).
We get in this case that the equilibrium pair of the production of the two firms is (49.51, 45.85) and the total
production will be x + y = 95.36.
Table 1: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with (40, 60)
n 0 1 2 5 10 20 30
xn 40 52.5 47.92 49.85 49.49 49.51205 49.51219
yn 60 46.6 44.72 46.11 45.83 45.85354 45.85366
Table 2: Number n of iterations needed by the a priori estimate if stared with (100, 20)
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 41 53 66 79 91
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Figure 1: The set D in the case 3c
Table 3: Number n of iterations needed by the a posteriori estimate if stared with (100, 20)
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 14 18 23 27 32
Let us consider a classical example, where the price function is a linear and so are the cost functions of both
players. Assuming the feasible market price is defined by P(x, y) = 120− x − y, it is expected that additional output x
from the first company as well as extra production y of the second one will cause decrease in prices. Therefore under
equilibrium conditions x+ y will be the total production of the two firms and it will also be reflected in prices. Let the
two firms have cost functions equal to 30x and 20y, respectively. The profit of the first one is
Π1(x, y) = xP(x, y) − 30x = x(120 − x − y) − 30x = 90x − x2 − xy
and the profit of the second one is
Π2(x, y) = yP(x, y) − 20y = y(120 − x − y) − 20y = 100y − y2 − xy.
Following Cournot model after solving (20) we get the response functions F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay of the two
firms F(y) =
90−y
2
and f (x) = 100−x
2
, where Ay = [0, 90], Ax = [0, 100] and D = Ax × Ay. Consequently it is a special
case of the general example with a = 60, s = 15, r = 10, p = 0, q = 1
2
, µ = 1
2
, ν = 0. Thus there exists an equilibrium
pair (x, y) and for any initial start in the economy where iterated sequences (xn, yn) converge to the market equilibrium
(x, y). We estimate in this case that the equilibrium pair of the production is (80/3, 110/3) and the total output will be
a = 190/3.
Let us assume that the two firms have started with output x0 = 40 and y0 = 60. In the following table we present
how, depending on the response functions F and f the output of each company will change.
Table 4: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with (40, 60)
n 0 1 2 5 10 20
xn 40 15 30.0 25.94 26.68 26.67
yn 60 30 42.5 36.25 36.69 36.67
Let us assume that the two firms have started from productions x0 = 100 and y0 = 20. In the next table we present
how using the response functions F and f the productions of the two firm will change
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Table 5: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with (100, 20)
n 0 1 2 5 10 20
xn 100 35 45.0 27.19 26.74 26.67
yn 20 0 32.5 34.38 36.65 36.67
Table 6: Number n of iterations needed by the a priori estimate if stared with (100, 20)
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 11 15 18 21 25
Table 7: Number n of iterations needed by the a posteriori estimate if stared with (100, 20)
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 11 15 18 21 25
5.1.2. A nonlinear case, when each player is producing a single product, while goods sold are perfect substitutes
Let us consider a market with two competing firms, producing perfect substitute products with quantities x ∈ Ax
and y ∈ Ay, respectively, where Ax, Ay ⊂ [0,+∞) and (X, ρ) be the complete metric space (R, | · |). Let us assume that
each firm produces at least 1 item, i.e. x, y ≥ 1 Let us consider the response functions of player one F(x, y) = 90−x−
y
8
−
√
y
2
2
and player two f (x, y) =
100− x
4
−y−√x
3
, where
(1) Ax = [1, 44] and Ay = [1, 33]
(2) D can be defined as D = Ax × Ay
It is easy to check that F : D = Ax × Ay → Ax, f : D = Ax × Ay → Ay and (F(D), f (D)) ⊆ D.
Indeed, we get
F(x, y) ≤ F(1, 1) = 44, F(x, y) ≥ F (44, 33) = 13.31
and
f (x, y) ≤ f (1, 1) = 32.33 < 33, f (x, y) ≥ f (44, 33) = 5.46
and therefore F : D → Ax, f : D → Ay and (F(D), f (D)) ⊆ D.
There exists ξ between the points y and v so that there holds
∣∣∣√y − √v∣∣∣ = 1
2
√
ξ
|y − v|. From the assumption that
y, v ≥ 1 we get that
∣∣∣√y − √v∣∣∣ ≤ 1
2
|y − v|. Using this last inequality we obtain
|F(x, y) − F(u, v)| ≤ 1
2
|x − u| + 1
16
|y − v| + 1
8
|y − v| = 1
2
|x − u| + 3
16
|y − v|
and
| f (z,w) − f (t, s)| ≤ 1
12
|z − t| + 1
3
|w − s| + 1
6
|w − s| = 1
12
|z − t| + 1
2
|w − s| .
Therefore
|F(x, y) − F(u, v)| + | f (z,w) − f (t, s)| ≤ 1
2
|x − u| + 3
16
|y − v| + 1
12
|z − t| + 1
2
|w − s|
and thus the ordered pair (F, f ) satisfies Assumption 1 with constants α = 1/2, β = 3/16, γ = 1/12 and δ = 1/2,
max{1/2 + 1/12, 3/16 + 1/2} = max{7/12, 11/16} = 7/12. Consequently there exists an equilibrium pair (x, y) and
for any initial start in the economy the iterated sequences (xn, yn) converge to the market equilibrium (x, y). We get
in this case that the equilibrium pair of the production of the two firms is (28.3, 21.9) and the total production will be
a = 50.2.
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Table 8: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with (10, 50)
n 0 1 2 5 10 20 30
xn 10 35.10 25.56 28.61 28.29 28.30747 28.30750
yn 50 14.77 23.50 21.99 21.89 21.90064 21.90066
Table 9: Number n of iterations needed by the a priori estimate if stared with (10, 50)
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 39 50 62 73 84
Table 10: Number n of iterations needed by the a posteriori estimate if stared with (10, 50)
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 12 16 20 24 28
Let us consider again a case with two players, producing two products, but let them know the market demand
function and let they behave rational, i.e. they a trying to maximize their profits, assuming that the rival player will do
the same.
Let there is no limit on the market, but let us assume that the total consumption is 100%. That is the market will
consume a constant 1, which is 100%, and the production of both firms will be a percentage of the consumption x and
y respectively, i.e. x, y ∈ [0, 1]. Let the market price be defined by P(x, y) = 1 − x+y
2
− x2+y2
24
, where x is the production
of one of the firms, y be the production of the other one, assuming that number 1 presents 100%. Let the two firms
have cost functions equal to Cx(x) = x/2 + x
2/16 and y/6 + y2/12, respectively. The profit of the first firm is
Π1(x, y) = xP(x, y) −Cx(x) =
7x
8
− 9x
2
16
− xy
2
− x
3
24
− xy
2
24
and the profit of the second firm is
Π2(x, y) = yP(x, y) −Cy =
5y
6
− 13y
2
24
− xy
2
− y
3
24
− x
2y
24
.
Following Cournot model after solving (20) we get the response functions F and f of the two players
F(x, y) =
7
8
− x
8
− y
2
− x
2
8
− y
2
24
and f (x, y) =
5
6
− x
2
− y
12
− y
2
8
− x
2
24
,
which satisfy F : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1] and f : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1], i.e. D = [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Using the inequality
|x2 − y2| = 2ξ|x − y| ≤ 2|x − y|, for any x, y ∈ [0, 1] and some ξ between x and y we obtain
|F(x, y) − F(u, v)| ≤ 3
8
|x − u| + 7
12
|y − v|
and
| f (z,w) − f (s, t)| ≤ 7
12
|z − t| + 7
24
|w − s| .
Therefore
|F(x, y) − F(u, v)| + | f (z,w) − f (s, t)| ≤ 3
8
|x − u| + 7
12
|y − v| + 7
12
|z − s| + 7
24
|w − t|
and thus the ordered pair (F, f ) satisfies Assumption 1 with constants α = 3/8, β = 7/12, γ = 7/12 and δ = 7/24.
There holds max{α + γ, β + δ} < 0.958. Thus there exists an equilibrium pair (x, y) and for any initial start in
the economy the iterated sequences (xn, yn) converge to the market equilibrium (x, y). We get in this case that the
equilibrium pair of the production of the two firms is (0.537, 0.451), i.e. the first firm will have a share of 53.7% and
the second one a share of 45.1% of the sold goods. The total production will be 0.989, i.e. 98.9% of the total demand
of the market.
Let us assume that the two firms have started from productions x0 = 40 and y0 = 60. In the next table we present
how using the response functions F and f the productions of the two firms change in time
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Table 11: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with (50%, 50%)
n 0 1 2 5 10 20
xn 50% 51.8% 53.3% 53.66% 53.735% 53.732%
yn 50% 46.4% 45.9% 45.17% 45.184% 45.181%
Table 12: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with (10%, 90%)
n 0 1 2 5 10 20
xn 10% 34.6% 49.2% 53.16% 53.749% 53.732%
yn 90% 58.4% 52.4% 45.19% 45.201% 45.181%
Table 13: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with (100%, 0%)
n 0 1 2 5 10 20
xn 100% 66.6% 61.4% 53.68% 53.757% 53.732%
yn 0% 25.0% 40.6% 44.55% 45.201% 45.181%
5.1.3. Each player is producing two product types, goods from each type being perfect substitutes
Let us consider a market with two competing firms, and each firm is producing two product types. For simplicity
we assume that goods from each type produced by major players are perfect substitutes. While it is possible that two
types have nothing it common, it still means that within each type customers can freely replace product from the first
company with one manufactured by the second one. Let us assume that each firm produces at least 1 item from each
product, i.e. x = (x1, x2), y = (y1, y2), x1, x2, y1, y2 ≥ 1. Let us denote the production of the two players by x = (x1, x2)
and y = (y1, y2), respectively.
Let the market of the two goods be endowed with the p norm, p ∈ [1,∞), i.e.
ρ((x1, x2), (y1, y2)) = ‖(x1, x2) − (y1, y2)‖p = (|x1 − y1|p + |x2 − y2|p)1/p .
Let us consider the response functions F(x, y) = (F1(x, y), F2(x, y)) and f (x, y) = ( f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) defined by
F(x, y) =

90 − x1 + x2
2
− y1 + y2
3
3
,
90 − x1 + x2
2
− y1 + y2
3
3
;
f (x, y) =

100 − x1 + x2
4
− y1 + y2
3
4
100 − x1 + x2
4
− y1 + y2
3
4
.
where
(1) Ax = [0, 30] × [0, 30] and Ay = [0, 25] × [0, 25]
(2) D = [0, 30] × [0, 30] × [0, 25] × [0, 25]
It is easy to see that (F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D, whenever (x, y) = ((x1, x2), (y1, y2)) ∈ D.
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Using the inequality a+b
2
≤ (ap+bp)1/p
21/p
, which holds for any a, b ≥ 0 we get the chain of inequalities
‖F(x, y) − F(u, v)‖p = ‖(F1(x, y), F2(x, y)) − (F1(u, v), F2(u, v))‖p
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

(u1+u2)−(x1+x2)
2
+
v1+v2−(y1+y2)
3
3
,
(u1+u2)−(x1+x2)
2
+
v1+v2−(y1+y2)
3
3

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
p
≤ 2
3
( |u1 − x1| + |u2 − x2|
2
+
|v1 − y1| + |v2 − y2|
3
)
=
2
3
|u1 − x1| + |u2 + x2|
2
+
4
9
|v1 − y1| + |v2 + y2|
2
≤ 2
p−1
p
3
(|x1 − u1|p + |x2 − y2|p)1/p + 2
p−1
p +1
9
(|y1 − v1|p + |y2 − v2|p)1/p
= 2
p−1
p
3
‖(x1, x2) − (u1, u2)‖p + 2
p−1
p +1
9
‖(y1, v2) − (y1, v2)‖p = 2
p−1
p
3
‖x − u‖p + 2
p−1
p +1
9
‖y − v‖p
and
‖ f (x, y) − f (u, v)‖p = ‖( f1(x, y), f2(x, y)) − ( f1(u, v), f2(u, v))‖p
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

(u1+u2)−(x1+x2)
4
+
v1+v2−(y1+y2)
3
3
,
(u1+u2)−(x1+x2)
4
+
v1+v2−(y1+y2)
3
3

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
p
≤ 2
3
( |u1 − x1| + |u2 − x2|
4
+
|v1 − y1| + |v2 − y2|
3
)
=
2
6
|u1 − x1| − |u2 + x2|
2
+
4
9
|v1 − y1| + |v2 + y2|
2
≤ 2
p−1
p
6
(|x1 − u1|p + |x2 − y2|p)1/p + 2
p−1
p +1
9
(|y1 − v1|p + |y2 − v2|p)1/p
= 2
p−1
p
6
‖(x1, x2) − (u1, u2)‖p + 2
p−1
p +1
9
‖(y1, v2) − (y1, v2)‖p = 2
p−1
p
6
‖x − u‖p + 2
p−1
p +1
9
‖y − v‖p.
Therefore
‖F(x, y) − F(u, v)‖ + ‖ f (z,w) − f (t, s)‖ ≤ 2
p−1
p
3
‖x − u‖ + 2
p−1
p
+1
9
‖y − v‖ + 2
p−1
p
6
‖z − t‖ + 2
p−1
p
+1
9
‖w − s‖ .
From the inequalities 2
p−1
p
3
+ 2
p−1
p
6
< 2
3
+ 1
3
= 1 and 2
p−1
p +1
9
+ 2
p−1
p +1
9
≤ 2 4
9
< 1 it follows that the ordered pair (F, f ) satisfies
Assumption 1 with constants α = 2
p−1
p
3
, β = 2
p−1
p +1
9
, γ = 2
p−1
p
6
and δ = 2
p−1
p +1
9
. Thus there exists an equilibrium pair
(x, y) and for any initial start in the economy the iterated sequences (xn, yn) converge to the market equilibrium (x, y).
We get in this case that the equilibrium pair of the production of the two firms is x = (19.27, 19.27), y = (19.36, 19.36)
and the total production will be a = (38.63, 38.63).
Table 14: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if started with x = (19.27, 19.27), y = (19.36, 19.36)
n 0 1 2
xn (10,10) (15.56,15.56) (21.39,21.39)
yn (50,50) (15.42,15.42) (20.49,20.49)
Table 15: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if started with x = (19.27, 19.27), y = (19.36, 19.36)
n 5 10 20
xn (19.09,19.09) (19.28,19.28) (19.27,19.27)
yn (19.28,19.28) (19.36,19.36) (19.36,19.36)
19
Table 16: Number n of iterations needed by the a priori estimate if stared with x = (19.27, 19.27), y = (19.36, 19.36) and p = 2
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 16 21 26 31 36
Table 17: Number n of iterations needed by the a posteriori estimate if stared with x = (19.27, 19.27), y = (19.36, 19.36) and p = 2
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 9 12 15 18 20
5.2. The players are producing a single product and compete on both quantities and prices
There is a large number of goods where companies can compete on both quality and prices. In this case the
equilibrium would depend on balanced decision on what market share to target at a reasonable price. Lets assume that
there are only two major players that produce homogeneous products. The first company can produce qualities from
the set Ax ⊆ [0,∞) at a price p ∈ Px ⊆ [0,∞) and the second one can produce qualities from the set Ay ⊆ [0,∞) at
a price p ∈ Px ⊆ [0,∞), where Ax, Ay, Px, Py be nonempty subsets. Let Ax × Px, Ay × Py be subsets of a complete
metric space (R2, ρ).
Assumption 2. Let there is a duopoly market, satisfying the following assumptions:
(1) The two firms are producing homogeneous, perfect substitute products.
(2) The first firm can produce qualities from the set Ax at a price p ∈ Px and the second firm can produce qualities
from the set Ay at a price p ∈ Px, where Ax × Px, Ay × Py be nonempty, closed subsets of a complete metric space
(R2, ρ).
(3) Let there exists a closed subset D ⊆ Ax × Px × Ay × Py → Ax, such that F : D → Ax × Px, f : D → Ay × Py
and (F(x, p, y, q), f (x, p, y, q)) ⊆ D for every (x, p, y, q) ∈ D be the response functions for firm one and two
respectively.
(4) Let there exist α, β, γ, δ > 0, max{α + γ, β + δ} < 1, such that the inequality
S 1 = ρ(F(x, p1, y, q1), F(u, p2, v, q2)) + ρ( f (z, p3,w, q3), f (t, p4, s, q4))
≤ αρ((x, p1), (u, p2)) + βρ((y, q1), (v, q2)) + γρ((z, p3), (t, p4)) + δρ((w, q3), (s, q4)) (22)
holds for all (x, p1, y, q1), (u, p2, v, q2), (z, p3,w, q3), (t, p4, s, q4) ∈ D.
Then
(I) There exists a unique pair (ξ, p, η, q) in Ax × Px × Ay × Py, which is a common coupled fixed point for the maps
F and f , i.e. a market equilibrium pair. Moreover the iteration sequences {xn}∞n=0, {pn}∞n=0, {yn}∞n=0 and {qn}∞n=0
converge to ξ, p, η, and q, respectively.
(II) a priori error estimates hold
max {ρ((xn, pn), (ξ, p)), ρ((yn, qn), (η, q))} ≤
kn
1 − k (ρ((x1, p1), (x0, p0)) + ρ((y1, q1), (y0, q0))); (23)
(III) a posteriori error estimates hold
max {ρ((xn, pn), (ξ, p)), ρ((yn, qn), (η, q))} ≤
k
1 − k (ρ((xn−1, pn−1), (xn, pn)) + ρ((yn−1, pn−1), (yn, qn))); (24)
(IV) The rate of convergence for the sequences of successive iterations is given by
ρ((xn, pn), (ξ, p)) + ρ((yn, qn), (η, q)) ≤ k (ρ((xn−1, pn−1, (ξ, p)) + ρ((yn−1, pn−1), (η, q))) , (25)
where k = max{α + γ, β + δ}.
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The proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 1.
Remark: If we put X = (x, p1), Y = (y, q1), U = (u, p2), V = (v, q2), Z = (z, p3), W = (w, q3), T = (t, p4),
S = (s, q4) then (22) can be written in the form
ρ(F(X, Y), F(U,V)) + ρ( f (Z,W), f (T, S )) ≤ αρ(X,U) + βρ(Y,V) + γρ(Z, T ) + δρ(W, S ) (26)
5.2.1. Example of a duopoly model, where players compete on quantities and prices simultaneously
Let us consider a market with two competing firms, producing the same product, and selling it at a price p and
q respectively, i.e. X = (x, p), Y = (y, q). Let us consider the response functions F(X, Y) = (F1(X, Y), F2(X, Y)) and
f (X, Y) = ( f1(X, Y), f2(X, Y)) defined by
F(X, Y) =

90 − x
2
− y
3
3
,
4 − p
2
− q
3
3
;
f (X, Y) =

100 − x
4
− y
3
4
5 − p
4
− q
3
4
.
Let X = (x, p) and Y = (y, q) be subsets of (R2, ‖ · ‖2) (the two dimensional Euclidean space). Let
(1) Ax = [0, 100]× [0, 5] and Ay = [0, 100] × [0, 4]
(2) D = [0, 100]× [0, 5] × [0, 100]× [0, 4]
It is easy to see that F : D → [0, 100] × [0, 5], f : D → [0, 100] × [0, 4] and (F(x, p, y, q), f (x, p, y, q)) ⊆ D for every
(x, p, y, q) ∈ D.
Using the inequality a+b
2
≤ (a2+b2)1/2
21/2
, which holds for any a, b ≥ 0 we get the chain of inequalities we obtain
S 2 = ‖F(x, p1, y, q1) − F(u, p2, v, q2)‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

90 − x
2
− y
3
3
,
4 − p1
2
− q1
3
3
 −

90 − u
2
− v
3
3
,
4 − p2
2
− q2
3
3

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

u − x
2
+
v − y
3
3
,
p1 − p2
2
+
q1 − q2
3
3

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
3
√( |u − x| + |v − y|
2
)2
+
( |p1 − p2| + |q1 − q2|
2
)2
≤ 1
3
( |u − x| + |v − y|
2
+
|p1 − p2| + |q1 − q2|
2
)
=
1
3
( |u − x| + |p1 − p2|
2
+
|v − y| + |q1 − q2|
2
)
≤ 1
3
√
2
√
|u − x|2 + |p1 − p2|2 +
1
3
√
2
√
|v − y| + |q1 − q2| =
1
3
√
2
ρ(U, X) +
1
3
√
2
ρ(V, Y)
and
S 3 = ‖ f (x, p1, y, q1) − f (u, p2, v, q2)‖2 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

100 − x
4
− y
3
4
,
5 − p1
4
− q1
3
4
 −

100 − u
4
− v
3
4
,
5 − p2
4
− q2
3
4

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥

u − x
4
+
v − y
3
4
,
p1 − p2
4
+
q1 − q2
3
4

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
4
√( |u − x| + |v − y|
3
)2
+
( |p1 − p2| + |q1 − q2|
3
)2
≤ 1
4
( |u − x| + |v − y|
3
+
|p1 − p2| + |q1 − q2|
3
)
<
1
4
( |u − x| + |p1 − p2|
2
+
|v − y| + |q1 − q2|
2
)
≤ 1
4
√
2
√
|u − x|2 + |p1 − p2|2 +
1
4
√
2
√
|v − y| + |q1 − q2| =
1
4
√
2
ρ(U, X) +
1
4
√
2
ρ(V, Y).
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Therefore
‖F(X, Y) − F(U,V)‖ + ‖ f (Z,W) − f (T, S )‖ ≤ 1
3
√
2
‖X − U‖ + 1
3
√
2
‖Y − V‖ + 1
4
√
2
‖Z − T‖ + 1
4
√
2
‖W − S ‖ .
From the inequalities 1
3
√
2
+ 1
4
√
2
< 1 it follows that the ordered pair (F, f ) satisfies Assumption 2 with constants
α = 1
3
√
2
, β = 1
3
√
2
, γ = 1
4
√
2
and δ = 1
4
√
2
. Thus there exists an equilibrium pair (x, y) and for any initial start in
the economy the iterated sequences (xn, yn) converge to the market equilibrium (x, y). We get in this case that the
equilibrium pair of the production of the two firms is x = (23.64, 1.03), y = (21.71, 1.09).
5.3. Players’ production sets have an empty intersection
Assumption 3. Let there is a duopoly market, satisfying the following assumptions:
(1) The two firms are producing homogeneous perfect substitute products.
(2) The first firm can produce qualities from the set Ax and the second firm can produce qualities from the set Ay,
where Ax and Ay be nonempty, closed and convex subsets of a uniformly convex Banach space (X, ‖ · ‖)
(3) Let there exist a closed and convex subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that
(F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D, be the response functions for firm one and two respectively
(4) Let there exist α, β > 0, α + β < 1, such that
‖F(x, y) − f (u, v)‖ ≤ α‖x − v‖ + β‖y − u‖ + (1 − (α + β))d (27)
for all (x, y), (u, v) ∈ Ax × Ay, where d = dist(Ax, Ay) = inf{‖x − y‖ : x ∈ Ax, y ∈ Ay}.
Then there exists a unique pair (ξ, η) in Ax × Ay, which is a coupled best point for the pair of maps (F, f ), i.e. a
market equilibrium pair. Moreover the iteration sequences {xn}∞n=0 and {yn}∞n=0, defined in Definition 5 converge to ξ
and η, respectively.
If in addition (X, ‖ · ‖) has a modulus of convexity of power type with constants (C, q) ∈ (0,∞) × (1,∞), then
(i) a priori error estimates hold
‖ξ − xm‖ ≤ M0 q
√
max{W0,1(x, y),W0,0(x, y)}
Cd
·
q
√
(α + β)m
1 − q√α + β ; ‖η − ym‖ ≤ N0
q
√
max{W0,1(y, x),W0,0(y, x)}
Cd
·
q
√
(α + β)m
1 − q√α + β ;
(ii) a posteriori error estimates hold
‖ξ − xn‖ ≤ Mn−1 q
√
max{Wn−1,n(x, y),Wn−1,n−1(x, y)}
Cd
c. ‖η − y2n‖ ≤ Nn−1 q
√
max{Wn−1,n(y, x),Wn−1,n−1(y, x)}
Cd
c,
whereWn,m(x, y) = ‖xn − xm‖ − d, Mn max{‖xn − yn‖, ‖xn − yn+1‖}, Nn max{‖xn − yn‖, ‖yn − xn+1‖} and c =
q
√
α+β
1− q√α+β .
The proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.
5.3.1. Players’ production sets have an empty intersection, each player is producing two goods
Let us consider a market with two competing firms, each firm produces two product and any one of the items is
completely replaceable with the similar product of the other firm. Let us assume that the first firm can produce much
less quantities than the second one, i.e. if x1, x2 be the quantities produced by the first firm and y1, y2 be the quantities
produced by the second one and, then x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1] and y1, y2 ∈ [2, 3]. Let Ax = [0, 1] × [0, 1] Ay = [2, 3] × [2, 3] be
considered as subsets of (R2, ‖ · ‖2), which is a uniformly convex Banach space with modulus of convexity δ‖·‖2(ε) ≥ ε
2
8
of power type [12]. Let us consider the response functions F(x1, x2, y1, y2) and f (x1, x2, y1, y2) defined by
F(x, y) =
{
3x1
8
+
x2
8
− 3y1
16
− y2
16
+ 1
x1
8
+
3x2
8
− y1
16
− 3y2
16
+ 1
, f (x, y) =
{ − 3x1
16
− x2
16
+
3y1
4
+
y2
4
+ 5
4
− x1
16
− 3x2
16
+
y1
4
+
3y2
4
+ 5
4
.
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It is easy to see that F : [0, 1]×[0, 1]×[2, 3]×[2, 3]→ [0, 1]×[0, 1] and f : [0, 1]×[0, 1]×[2, 3]×[2, 3]→ [2, 3]×[2, 3]
Indeed the inequalities 0 ≤ 3x1
8
+
x2
8
− 3y1
16
− y2
16
+ 1 ≤ 1 are equivalent to
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
3y1
16
+
y2
16
≤ 3x1
8
+
x2
8
+ 1
3x1
8
+
x2
8
≤ 3y1
16
+
y2
16
for (x1, x2, y1, y2) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [2, 3] × [2, 3].
The inequalities 2 ≤ − 3u1
16
− u2
16
+
3v1
4
+
v2
4
+ 5
4
≤ 3 are equivalent to
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
3u1
16
+
u2
16
≤ 3v1
4
+
v2
4
3v1
4
+
v2
4
≤ 7
4
+
3u1
16
+
u2
16
for (u1, u2, v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [2, 3] × [2, 3].
Using the inequality
(
3a
4
+ b
4
)2 ≤ 3
4
a2 + 1
4
b2, i.e.
∣∣∣ 3a
4
+ b
4
∣∣∣ ≤ √3a2+b2
2
we obtain
S 4 = ‖F(x1, x2, y1, y2) − f (u1, u2, v1, v2)‖2
=
∥∥∥∥( 3x18 + x28 − 3y116 − y216 + 1, x18 + 3x28 − y116 − 3y216 + 1) − (− 3u116 − u216 + 3v14 + v24 + 54 ,− u116 − 3u216 + v14 + 3v24 + 54 )∥∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥∥( 14 + 3(x1−v1)8 + x2−v28 , 14 + 3(u1−y1)16 + u2−y216 )∥∥∥∥2 ≤
∥∥∥∥( 14 , 14 )∥∥∥∥2 +
∥∥∥∥( 3(x1−v1)8 + x2−v28 , 3(u1−y1)16 + u2−y216 )∥∥∥∥2
≤
√
2
4
+
∥∥∥∥( 3(x1−v1)8 + x2−v28 , 0)∥∥∥∥2 +
∥∥∥∥(0, 3(u1−y1)16 + u2−y216 )∥∥∥∥2
=
√
2
4
+ 1
2
∥∥∥∥( 3(x1−v1)4 + x2−v24 , 0)∥∥∥∥2 + 14
∥∥∥∥(0, 3(u1−y1)4 + u2−y24 )∥∥∥∥2
=
√
2
4
+ 1
2
∣∣∣ 3(x1−v1)
4
+
x2−v2
4
∣∣∣ + 1
4
∣∣∣ 3(u1−y1)
4
+
u2−y2
4
∣∣∣
2
≤
√
2
4
+
√
3|x1−v1 |2+|x2−v2 |2
4
+
√
3|u1−y1|2+|u2−y2|2
8
≤
√
2
4
+
√
3
4
√
|x1 − v1|2 + |x2 − v2|2 +
√
3
8
√
|u1 − y1|2 + |u2 − y2|2 =
√
3
4
‖x − v‖2 +
√
3
8
‖y − u‖2 +
√
2
4
≤
√
3
4
‖x − v‖2 +
√
3
8
‖y − u‖2 +
(
1 −
√
3
4
−
√
3
8
) √
2 =
√
3
4
‖x − v‖2 +
√
3
8
‖y − u‖2 +
(
1 −
√
3
4
−
√
3
8
)
d,
where d = dist([0, 1] × [0, 1], [2, 3] × [2, 3]) =
√
2. Therefore the ordered pair (F, f ) satisfies Assumption 3 with
constants α =
√
3
4
, β =
√
3
8
. Thus there exists an equilibrium pair (x, y) = ((x1, x2), (y1, y2)) and for any initial start in
the economy, the iterated sequence (xn, yn) = ((xn
1
, xn
2
), (yn
1
, yn
2
)) converges to the market equilibrium (x, y). We get in
this case that the equilibrium pair of the production of the two firms is x = (1, 1), y = (2, 2) and the total production
will be a = (3, 3).
Table 18: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with ((0.01, 0.2), (2.9, 2.1))
n 0 1 2
(xn
1
, xn
2
) (0.01,0.9) (0.44,0.76) (0.66,0.75)
(yn
1
, yn
2
) (2.90,2.1) (2.44,2.33) (2.31,2.27)
Table 19: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with ((0.01, 0.2), (2.9, 2.1))
n5 10 20
(xn
1
, xn
2
) (0.87,0.88) (0.97,0.97) (1,1)
(yn
1
, yn
2
) (2.12,2.12) (2.03,2.03) (2,2)
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5.4. Equilibrium in the case, when the two player are producing just one good and the production set have an empty
intersection
Let us recall that the properties of the modulus of convexity δ‖·‖ are investigated if the Banach space is at least two
dimensional. As far as R, endowed with its canonical norm is a subspace of R2
2
we have δ(R,|·|)(ε) ≥ δ(R2
2
,‖·‖2)(ε) =
ε2
8
.
A direct calculaion shows that δ(R,|·|)(ε) = ε2 [13].
We will formulate Assumption 3 in the case when the underlying Banach space is (R, | · |).
Assumption 4. Let there is a duopoly market, satisfying the following assumptions:
(1) The two firms are producing homogeneous perfect substitute products
(2) The first firm can produce qualities from the set Ax and the second firm can produce qualities from the set Ay,
where Ax and Ay be nonempty closed intervals of (R, | · |)
(3) Let there exist a close and convex subset D ⊆ Ax × Ay and maps F : D → Ax and f : D → Ay, such that
(F(x, y), f (x, y)) ⊆ D for every (x, y) ∈ D, be the response functions for firm one and two respectively
(4) Let there exist α, β > 0, α + β < 1, such that
|F(x, y) − f (u, v)| ≤ α|x − v| + β|y − u| + (1 − (α + β))d (28)
for all (x, y), (u, v) ∈ Ax × Ay, where d = dist(Ax, Ay) = inf{|x − y| : x ∈ Ax, y ∈ Ay}.
Then there exists a unique pair (ξ, η) in Ax × Ay, which is a coupled best point for the pair of maps (F, f ), i.e. a
market equilibrium pair. Moreover the iteration sequences {xn}∞n=0 and {yn}∞n=0+9 converge to ξ and η, respectively.
(i) a priori error estimates hold
|ξ − xm| ≤ 2max{|x0 − y0|, |x0 − y1|}
max{W0,1(x, y),W0,0(x, y)}
d
· (α + β)
m
1 − (α + β) ;
|η − ym| ≤ 2max{|x0 − y0|, |x1 − y0|}
max{W0,1(y, x),W0,0(y, x)}
d
· (α + β)
m
1 − (α + β) ;
(ii) a posteriori error estimates hold
|ξ − xn| ≤ 2max{|xn−1 − yn−1|, |xn−1 − yn|}
max{Wn−1,n(x, y),Wn−1,n−1(x, y)}
d
α + β
1 − (α + β) .
|η − yn| ≤ 2max{|xn−1 − yn−1|, |xn − yn−1|}
max{Wn−1,n(y, x),Wn−1,n−1(y, x)}
d
α + β
1 − (α + β) ,
whereWn,m(x, y) = |xn − xm| − d.
The proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 2 and the remark that (R, | · |) is an uniformly convex Banach space
with modulus of convexity δ|·|(ε) = ε2 .
5.4.1. Example when the two players are producing just one good
Let us consider a market with two competing firms, producing two products, that are perfect substitutes. Let us
assume that the first firm can produce much smaller quantities than the second one, i.e. x, y, so that x ∈ [0, 1] and
y ∈ [2, 3]. Let us consider the response functions F(x, y) and f (x, y) defined by
F(x, y) =
x
2
− y
4
+ 1, f (x, y) = −u
4
+
v
2
+
5
4
It is easy to see that F : [0, 1] × [2, 3]→ [0, 1] and f : [0, 1] × [2, 3]→ [2, 3]
24
Indeed the inequalities 0 ≤ x
2
− y
4
+ 1 ≤ 1 are equivalent to∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
y
4
≤ x
2
+ 1
x
2
≤ y
4
for (x, y) ∈ [0, 1] × [2, 3].
The inequalities 2 ≤ − u
4
+ v
2
+ 5
4
≤ 3 are equivalent to∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
3
4
+ u
4
≤ v
2
v
2
≤ 7
4
+ u
4
for (u, v) ∈ [0, 1] × [2, 3].
Then we obtain
|F(x, y) − f (u, v)| =
∣∣∣∣∣−u4 + v2 + 54 −
(
x
2
− y
4
+ 1
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ |v − x|2 + |y − u|4 +
∣∣∣∣∣54 − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
=
|v − x|
2
+
|y − u|
4
+
1
4
=
|v − x|
2
+
|y − u|
4
+
(
1 −
(
1
2
+
1
4
))
d.
Therefore the ordered pair (F, f ) satisfies Assumption 4 with constants α = 1
2
, β = 1
4
. Thus there exists an equilibrium
pair (x, y) and for any initial start in the economy the iterated sequences (xn, yn) converge to the market equilibrium
(x, y). We get in this case that the equilibrium pair of the production of the two firms is x = 1, y = 2 and the total
production will be a = 3.
Table 20: Values of the iterated sequence (xn , yn) if stared with (0.2, 2.8)
n 0 1 2 5 10 20 30
xn 0.2 0.4 0.55 0.81 0.95 0.997 0.9998
yn 2.8 2.6 2.45 2.18 2.04 2.002 2.0001
Table 21: Number n of iterations needed by the a priori estimate if stared with (0.2, 2.8)
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 21 29 37 45 53
Table 22: Number n of iterations needed by the a posteriori estimate if stared with (100, 20)
ε 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001 0.00001
n 17 25 33 41 49
5.5. Conclusion
Markets dominated by a small group of players are not uncommon even in a fast moving global economy. There-
fore it is essential to analyze these cases, understand what leads to equilibrium and how different companies respond
to changes in the economic environment. In this paper we have built a model on existence and uniqueness of market
equilibrium in oligopoly markets that can be derived from response functions of major players. We assume that goods
produced by different market players are perfect substitutes as this simplifies mathematical description of the model.
Due to the fact that response functions can also account for difference in product qualities, the model can also be ap-
plied to situations where price is not the only factor on which companies compete. With carefully constructed response
function it is possible to fully comprehend all five basic factors influencing competition - product features, number of
sellers, information ability and barriers to entry. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium can be analyzed with both
linear and non-linear response functions which proves to be a very flexible approach when studying different markets,
which despite being dominated by small number of companies may have quite different characteristics. Applications
25
of the suggested model when production sets of market participants have empty intersection are particularly important
when it is necessary to account for real world limitations like huge economies of scale or unique resources available to
some players. One specific application and advantage of the suggested model is that calibration of response functions
can be performed in a way that matches observed past behavior (output and prices) or major market players. This way
it is possible to assess not only equilibrium stability but also the way that different companies react to changes in the
environment.
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